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An exploratory investigation of barriers and enablers affecting investment in renewable 
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Abstract/Summary 
The last few years has seen considerable research expenditure on renewable fuel technologies. 
However, in many cases, the necessary sustained and long term funding from the investment 
community has not been realised at a level needed to allow technologies to become reality. 
ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽŐůŽďĂůĐŽŶƐƵůƚŝŶŐĨŝƌŵĞůŽŝƚƚĞ ?ƐƌĞĐĞŶƚƌĞŶĞǁĂďůĞĞŶĞƌŐǇƌĞƉŽƌƚ [1] many renewable 
energy projects stalled or were not completed because of issues including the global economy, the 
state of government finances, difficulties in funding, and regulatory uncertainty. This investigation 
concentrates on the funding aspect and explores the perceived barriers and enablers to renewable 
technologies within the investment and renewables community. Thematic analysis of 14 in-depth 
interviews with representatives from renewable energy producers, banks, and investment 
companies identified key factors affecting the psychology of investor behaviour in renewables. 8 key 
issues are highlighted including a range of barriers and enablers, the role of the government, balance 
between cost/risk, value/return on investment, investment timescales, personality/individual 
differences of investors, and the level of innovation in the renewable technology. It was particularly 
notable that in the findings the role of the government was discussed more than other themes and 
generally in quite critical terms highlighting the need to ensure consistency in government funding 
and policy and a greater understanding of how government decision making happens. Specific 
findings such as these illustrate the value of crossing disciplinary boundaries and highlights potential 
further research in this interdisciplinary field. Behavioural science and economic psychology in 
particular has much to offer at the interface of other disciplines such as political science and financial 
economics.  
Keywords: renewables, investment, in-depth interviews, technology, funding, economic psychology 
 Introduction 
The last few years has seen considerable research expenditure on renewable fuel 
technologies. Yet, despite multi-million pound projects such as the UK Carbon Trust Algae Biofuel 
Challenge, as well as substantial venture capitalist funding, the necessary large-scale, long term 
funding needed by the investment community has not been realised at a level needed to allow many 
technologies to become reality. If we consider the case of algae biofuels as a representative 
example, financing is identified as a key challenge for the industry in the US National Algae 
Association 2010 Review. The review identifies an article written by Will Thurmond of Emerging 
Markets Online as summing up the situation quite well. According to this article, the "Big 4" algae 
labs in San Diego, Sapphire Energy, Scripps Institute of Oceanography, Synthetic Genomics, and SD-
CAB at UC-San Diego affiliated with the DOE's CAB-COMM, represent nearly $1 billion in funding 
from private and public sector investment, despite the fact that none of these ventures is yet in 
commercial production.   
Thus it appears that the only way the renewable sector will grow at the scale needed is for 
stakeholders to invest significant funds. However, it seems that because of the deep-seated 
perceptions about the renewable sector, realising this investment might be a challenge. A small 
number of investment banks have emerged specialising in renewable and sustainable development 
investment portfolios, such as Piper Jaffrey in the US, and Earth Capital Partners in the UK. From 
informal communications with those in the sustainable energy sector it has been commented that 
investments in sustainable, renewable and clean technologies tend to be resilient with respect to 
market volatility compared to many other investments. As a result, investors such as pension fund 
managers, high net worth individuals have yet to take up these investment products. Since the 
present investigation is aiming to explore the perceived barriers and enablers to investment in 
renewable technologies in UK, a short review of the market growth and policies is introduced below.  
The UK government has a number of policies designed to support the renewables industry 
ĂŶĚŝƐ “ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŽŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŽĨĞŶĞƌŐǇǁĞƵƐĞĨƌŽŵƌĞŶĞǁĂďůĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ?dŚĞ
government will help business develop in this area to put the UK at the forefront of new renewable 
technologies ? ?2]. UK policy has included financial incentives (for example feed in tariffs (FITs)) but 
like many other countries government subsidies have been reduced due to plunging green energy 
technology prices and economic austerity measures. Alongside the UK policies and legislation the 
ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶ ?ƐZĞŶĞǁĂďůĞƐŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚƚŚĞĂĚŽƉƚŝŽŶŽĨŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƚĂƌŐĞƚƐĨŽƌƌĞŶĞǁĂďůĞƐ ?
The latest of these, ƚŚĞZĞŶĞǁĂďůĞŶĞƌŐǇŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?   ‘Z ? ?ƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚŝŶƚŚĞ
UK, 15% of final energy consumption- calculated on a net calorific value basis, and with a cap on fuel 
used for air transport- should be accounted for by energy from renewable sources by 2020.   
 The UK is making some progress in renewables with a 2% increase in electricity generation 
from renewable sources between 2009 and 2010, an increase of 75% during 2010 in offshore wind 
generation and a 17% increase during 2010 of heat from renewable sources. Using the method 
required by the Renewables Directive 3.3% of energy consumption in 2010 came from renewable 
sources, up 3% from 2009 (RESTATS, the Renewable Energy STATisticS database)[3]. 
However as the Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) states  “ŝnvestment 
decisions over the next decade in nuclear, renewable and fossil-fuel powered infrastructure, will play 
an essential part in determining whether or not long-term targets to decarbonise the energy system 
ĂƌĞŵĞƚ ?(p 13)[2]. In 2011 the US was the biggest investor in green energy with more than $48bn 
invested in the sector, up from $34bn in 2010. Globally there was $263bn investment in 2011, up 
6.5% from 2010 levels. The UK was 7th with $9.4bn of investment in 2011 [4]. 
DECC states that at least $270 trillion of investment will be required globally between now 
and 2050 with £79 billion needed in the UK to meet the government ?s ambitious renewable energy 
target of 30GW of additional capacity [5] although ƚŚĞh< ?ƐďŝŶĚŝŶŐĐŽmmitments  W under the 2008 
ůŝŵĂƚĞŚĂŶŐĞĐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞh ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?ƌĞŶĞǁĂďůĞĞŶĞƌŐǇĚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ W could be met with just 19GW of 
extra capacity, costing £51 billion. The report estimates that around £14.5 billion of capital has 
already been committed which reduces this figure to £36.6 billion and estimates that around £19.6 
billion will be required between 2013 and 2015, given the assumption that the current Renewables 
Obligation Certificate (ROC) support regime for onshore and offshore wind will remain in place until 
2017, and the timing of finance needed for projects. dŚĞƌĞƉŽƌƚĂůƐŽǁĂƌŶƐƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĂůŝŵŝƚĞĚ
number of investors who understand this space  W particularly newer technologies such as offshore 
wind  W and are willing to commit large sums to its construction. With the anticipated spike in capital 
demand occurring with such a short lead time (2013), there is some doubt as to the number of new 
investors who will have come up to speed sufficiently to invest in this capital intensive and 
somewhat unproven technology (pp.11-12)[5] ? ?  
 While the UK government states that it supports the need for further investment;  “ŝĨǁĞĂƌĞ
to make the UK more energy secure, help protect consumers from fossil fuel price fluctuations, drive 
investment in new jobs and businesses and keep us on track to meet our carbon reduction 
ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞĐŽŵŝŶŐĚĞĐĂĚĞƐ ?[6], ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƐŽŵĞǁŚŽƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ “ŚĂƐ
totally failed to grasp the financial necessity of building a low-ĐĂƌďŽŶĨƵƚƵƌĞ ?[7]. Goldsmith [8] 
stated that uncertainty over the government's commitment was harming the UK's transition to a low 
carbon economy and that in particular changes in policy were "the one risk all investors highlight 
when they consider putting funds into clean technology" [8]. Moreover, according to global 
ĐŽŶƐƵůƚŝŶŐĨŝƌŵĞůŽŝƚƚĞ ?ƐƌĞĐĞŶƚƌĞŶĞǁĂďůĞĞŶĞƌŐǇƌĞƉŽƌƚ ? ? ?ŵĂŶǇƌĞŶĞǁĂďůĞĞŶĞƌŐǇƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐ
stalled or were not completed because of issues ranging from the global economy, the state of 
government finances, difficulties in funding and regulatory uncertainty. 
 This research seeks to clarify the position and view of renewable energy investment from 
the investment and renewable communities and to highlight the barriers and enablers in ensuring 
the necessary investment in this area is forthcoming. In doing so the research also seeks to explore 
whether the criticisms about government policy and its effects on renewables investment are 
evidenced by the experiences and perspectives of those involved at the heart of the process. While 
this research focuses on investment specific to renewables it is important to note that this falls 
within a wider literature on the psychology of investment behaviour as well as drawing from 
behavioural economics and economic psychology and highlights the interdisciplinary of this area of 
research ?ƐŚŽƌƚůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞƌĞǀŝĞǁŝƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚŚĞƌĞƚŽŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽ
the evidence base in relation to the following areas: general investment behaviour, ethical 
investment, motivations behind ethical investments and green investments. 
 Literature Review 
Research on the generic investment behaviour of both individuals and companies covers a 
wide range of literatures and perspectives. One is behavioural finance, which attempts to better 
understand and explain how emotions and cognitive errors influence investors and the decision-
making process. The study of psychology and other social sciences can shed considerable light on the 
efficiency of financial markets as well as explain many stock market anomalies, market bubbles, and 
crashes. For example, the outperformance of value investing results from investor's irrational 
overconfidence in exciting growth companies and from the fact that investors generate pleasure and 
pride from owning growth stocks.  It is a key area of research in investment behaviour and involves 
work looking at Bayes Rule, Expected Utility Theory and the importance of arbitrage [9], the Efficient 
Market Hypotheses [10], and Prospect Theory [11] amongst others. Recent work has also explored 
investor behaviour through neuroscience exploring areas as extensive as value [12], detection of 
patterns [13], and the prediction of the unpredictable [14].  
Within the study of investment behaviour a particular type of investment has gained 
interest, that of ethical or socially responsible investment (SRI). Ethical investing dates back to the 
nineteenth century and to religious movements such as the Quakers, the Methodist Church, and the 
Church of England who, when investing on the Stock Exchange, wanted to avoid companies involved 
in tobacco and gambling. In 1971 the Pax World Fund was set up in the USA, this famously avoided 
investments associated with the Vietnam War and in the 1980s many companies who had strong 
links with South Africa and the apartheid regime were avoided by investors. The demand for SRI 
funds is increasing with evidence pointing towards a situation where consumers consider both the 
environmental and individual consequences of products and services before making a purchase 
decision [15]. Handcock [16] asked individuals which of the following were important when 
investing:  environmental sustainability, positive relationships with stakeholders, human rights, 
labour standards and working conditions and countering bribery. Notably out of these 
considerations environmental sustainability scored the highest at 33%. While these types of SRI 
funds have become popular there is research that suggests that consumers perceive them to be less 
profitable [16] although the objective evidence for this is mixed [17-19]. 
Other studies have looked at the motivation behind SRI. Lewis and Mackenzie [20] 
conducted a questionnaire which was completed by 1146 ethical investors from within the UK.  
When they looked at the profile of these ethical investors they found that they were much the same 
as for standard investors, with most having professional qualifications and being over the age of 45. 
However, more than expected by chance voted either liberal democrat or labor, had experience in a 
caring profession such as health or education and were actively involved in charities or 
religious/environmental groups. In subsequent research Lewis [21] carried out two sets of focus 
groups. dŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞĚŽĨ ? ? ‘ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ?ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ?ƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞĚŽĨ ? ?ĞƚŚŝĐĂů ?ŐƌĞĞŶ
investors, each of these groups were broken into 7 focus groups.  Discussions centered on 
motivations for investment, moral dilemmas faced and what they were hoping to achieve. Both 
groups were not happy to attribute investments to solely economic reasons, with the ethical group 
expressing unease with capitalism and the UK government, feeling their investment choices were 
required due to government failure.  Lewis [21] also notes three main motivations for SRI are 
precaution (security and stability), foresight (preparation for old age) and calculation (capital 
growth) supporting their earlier research.   
Havermann and Webster [22] argue that financial return for some ethical investors is not of 
primary importance, with some willing to forgo a greater profit in order to fulfill these beliefs; this 
can be seen on a smaller scale by the fact that many consumers are happy to pay more for a fair 
trade product. Havermann and Webster [22] carried out a consumer questionnaire with the results 
indicating that 94% of respondents had paid more for higher price fair trade products and 65% 
suggested that they would not sacrifice values for profit. When asked which issue is the most 
important to you when investing your money (the choices being profit, long term goals, regular 
income, low risk and ethicality), low risk scored the highest at 31%, with only 19% stating profit as 
the most important factor. 
Green or environmental investment has been highlighted as an important component of SRI 
[16], but this area has received little specific attention in the literature at the individual or company 
levels. Past research was often concerned with wider issues of environmental sustainability of 
companies, rather than specifically investment within the renewables industry. For example a 
number of studies explore how corporate social responsibility (CSR) and environmental reporting in 
companies affects the behaviour of investors. Wang, Qui, and Kong [23] ĨŽƵŶĚƚŚĂƚĂĨŝƌŵ ?Ɛ^Z
performance is only likely to affect the decisions of institutional investors after an environmental 
incident (such as the BP spillage) and this effect is not observed for individual investors. Ahmed, 
Islam, Mahtab, and Hasan [24] studied specifically how CSR performance affects institutional 
investment, based on the idea that they take a longer term view compared to individual investors; 
they cannot reshuffle their portfolios without significant loss of value, so will be interested in long 
term stability. Overall they found a positive relationship between increased CSR and institutional 
investment in socially responsible companies.  
In terms of environmental reporting, Berthelot, Coulmont, and Serret [25] found that 
investors value sustainability reports. Holm and Rikhardsson [26, 27] found that environmental 
information has the potential to affect investment decisions - although this is affected by the 
investment timescale, the experience of the investor, and whether the information provided is 
qualitative or quantitative. However, Koeller, Weber, Fenchel, and Scholz [28] suggested that there 
is a need for a reliable comparative assessment of sustainability of ethical funds, which is not 
currently available, to support investment choices. In addition, Demirel and Kesidou [29] highlight 
the need for specific environmental regulations which stimulate investments in Environmental 
Research and Development (ECORD), by working in the area of eco-innovations, that is  “ƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶ
or implementation of new, or significantly improved products (goods and services), processes, 
marketing methods, organisational structures and institutional arrangements which-with or without 
intent-ůĞĂĚƚŽĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚƚŽƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƐ ? ?p 19)[30].   
 While some of the above literature points to issues of interest in general sustainable 
investment and environmental performance of companies, it does not specifically look at 
investments in renewable companies. As this is an area of importance for meeting energy targets, 
this investigation concentrates on these investments.   
 
Methodology 
As an exploratory study, in-depth semi-structured interviews were determined to be the 
best data collection strategy. In-depth semi-structured interviews are used within work exploring 
end users of products, as well with business decision making environments [e.g., 31-33]. Therefore 
this strategy was deemed appropriate for this study.    
Sample:  The semi-structured interviews sought to explore the barriers and enablers 
affecting investment in renewable technologies. Our sample was composed of company 
representatives who were interviewed, if possible, in their offices or work environments to ensure 
they felt relaxed and at ease. Fourteen in-depth interviews were carried out between August 2011 
and June 2012, each of which lasted between 30 and 80 minutes. Three main groups of companies 
were included within the interviews: investment companies, banks, and renewable technology 
companies (who had and had not been successful in gaining funding: see Table 1 for further details). 
A registered charity supporting renewables investment was also included, as well as a stockbroker 
and a law firm who had experience in renewable investment and advice. Selection of participants 
was by convenience sample with participants recruited through pre-existing contacts with the 
Durham Energy Institute. In addition, following each interview, the interviewee would be asked if 
they had any further contacts that would be happy to be approached. Such an informal approach 
was used because in the early stage of data collection this was found to be ŵŽƌĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞƚŚĂŶ ‘ĐŽůĚ
ĐĂůůŝŶŐ ?, as it built the trusted relationship required for open and honest discussion. Many more 
people were contacted than were interviewed with the time constraints of the potential interviewee 
being the main reason for the contact not resulting in an interview. 
To reflect the different viewpoints of the groups interviewed, three different interview 
schedules were used (and adapted for other types of companies) which covered similar topics 
including: personal and company background, the decision making process (including use of 
information, preferences and influences), systems and procedures, strategies, and the future. The 
interviews were semi-structured, with participants encouraged to talk beyond the outline topics and 
to discuss what they thought was important in renewables investment. Participants were sent the 
interview schedule and introductory information prior to the interview and were reminded of the 
confidentiality of the discussion on the day. Each interview was carried out with either one or two 
researchers, these interviews were carried out face to face in most instances, when this failed a 
telephone interview was carried out. The interview always began with an overview of the purpose of 
the project and how it was funded. Anonymity was highlighted and consent was obtained from each 
participant.   
Table 1:  Participants and Interview Details 
Participant Type Energy relationship Representative of 
Company 
Date of Interview 
Investment and 
Advisory 
Investment Associate 6th Dec 2011 
Investment and 
Advisory 
Investment Consultant and 
Advisor 
Partner 29th Nov 2011 
Investment and Independent Financial Managing Director 9th Feb 2012 
Advisory Advisor 
Investment and 
Advisory 
Investment Company 
specialising in environmental 
investment 
Partner 8th Aug 2011 
Investment and 
Advisory 
Investment Company Partner 15th Aug 2011 
Bank Bank Alternatives 
Analyst 
15th Aug 2011 
Bank Bank Branch Manager 16th Aug 2011 
Renewables 
Technology 
Renewables Company 
(Biofuels) 
Director 8th Aug 2011 
Renewables 
Technology 
Renewables Company (Tidal) Director 2nd Sept 2011 
Renewables 
Technology 
Renewables Company (wind) CEO 16th Aug 2011 
Renewables 
Technology 
Registered Charity 
promoting and supporting 
sustainable development 
Director 29th Nov 2011 
Renewables 
Technology 
Law and Advisory Partner 11th June 2012 
Renewables 
Technology 
Stockbroker Associate 30th April 2012 
 
 Analysis: Interviews were audio-taped and transcribed verbatim. The data collected was 
analysed by thematic analysis using Nvivo software. Thematic analysis was used to analyse the data 
and is one of the most commonly used methods of qualitative analysis. In thematic analysis [34] the 
task of the researcher is to identify a limited number of themes which adequately reflect their data. 
Thematic analysts create their codes by defining what they see in the data and codes emerge as the 
data is scrutinised. Hence, coding is a fluid process in which codes may be modified or altered as 
ideas develop. Themes which integrate sets of codes are then defined by the researchers and 
illustrated in the report results below with examples (and further examples in the appendix). Eight 
main themes were identified as being of central importance to all categories of participants and will 
be discussed in the next section.   
Results 
Results of the thematic analysis are presented here following the eight main themes: 
Barriers, Enablers, Role of Government, Cost/Risk, Value/Return on Investment, Timescale, 
Personality/Individual Values, and Level of Innovation. Each of these was identifiable in the majority 
of the interviews and will be discussed in turn1. Illustrative examples for the most common themes 
are provided below  W with more examples shown in the Appendix. 
                                                             
1 Seven other minor themes (the investment organisation, other stakeholders, society/public opinion, role of 
the media, size of the investment, importance of reputation and importance of the management team) were 
also identified within the interviews and for some of the respondents played a part in their decision making, 
behaviour and attitudes.  These themes did not come out in every interview but were seen across some and 
therefore are not identified as as important as the main themes outlined above.  Due to space constraints 
these are not reported here.     
Barriers:  A number of specific types of barriers were identified. The most prevalent of these 
were cost barriers, communication barriers, fiduciary duty barriers, and poor communication from 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŽǀĞƌƉŽůŝĐǇĂŶĚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞcommitment to policy: 
 “ ?ǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚŵŝŶĚǁŚĂƚƉŽůŝĐǇǁĞ ?ƌĞƐĞƚǁŝƚŚŝŶƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞďŽƵŶĚƐ ?ďƵƚŝĨǇou set it, make 
ŝƚůĂƐƚĨŽƌĂƚůĞĂƐƚƚĞŶǇĞĂƌƐ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌƉŽůŝĐǇǇŽƵƐĞƚǁĞĐĂŶǁŽƌŬĂƌŽƵŶĚ ? ?
(Specialist Investment Company)  
 The issue of fiduciary duty and SRI investment has been explored [35, 36] especially in 
relation to the United Nations EnǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚWƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐ ?&ŝŶĂŶĐĞ/ŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ?hEW&/ ?, commonly 
known as the Freshfields Report. They support that fiduciary duty is often cited as the reason why 
environmental and SRI issues are not taken into account in investment decisions. A survey of pension 
fund trustees [37] notes that as many as 45% of respondents indicated that considerations of 
fiduciary duty were their main reason for not engaging more actively in SRI. The Freshfields report 
was heralded as a turning point suggesting that SRI issues should and could be taken into account 
within the law but Sandberg however suggests that this optimism may not be completely warranted 
as only some  ‘ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂů ?ƐŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?^' ?ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚ ŽŶƐĐĂŶŽŶůǇďĞƚĂŬĞŶŝŶƚŽ
account sometimes [35, 36]. He suggests that the report actually rules out exactly the type of SRI 
which proponents of social responsibility and environmental sustainability should hold in highest 
regard:  proactive cases and socially effective investment strategies. Unfortunately this potentially 
rules out investment in risky innovative technologies, methods or ideas and hence many renewable 
technologies.  He in turn notes that legal reform is needed to overcome this barrier. However, it is 
pleasing to note that one respondent commented on stakeholders who are in some cases looking 
beyond this: 
  “ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞŝƌƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐǁĞƌĞƐƚĂƌƚŝŶŐƚŽƐĂǇ ?ůŽŽŬ ?ŽŬĂǇƐŽǇŽƵŚĂǀĞĂĨŝĚƵĐŝĂƌǇ
duty to deliver a financial return to us, but actually practically we want you to take other 
things inƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?(Specialist Investor) 
Enablers: As well as a number of barriers, some enablers, i.e. things that had or could help 
investment in companies, were also identified within the interviews. The strongest enabler was the 
importance of having appropriate knowledge and skills. It was clear that in order for investors to be 
interested in a company, the company had to show it had the appropriate knowledge and skills to 
succeed, although this did not always have to be in relation to a past history of renewables.   
 Knowledge and skills of the investor also acted as both an enabler and a barrier (as in (1) 
above). It was also certainly the case that some companies do not always have the knowledge and 
skills they need initially, but this also links to another enabler that was noted, that of network and 
contacts where companies can gain or use the knowledge and skills needed. Having a support 
ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽĐŽƵůĚƐŚĂƌĞĂŶĚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĂƐǁĞůůĂƐŚĞůƉŝŶŐŐĞƚĂ ‘ĨŽŽƚŝŶƚŚĞĚŽŽƌ ?
was noted as of vital importance in successful ventures. However, one company was an exception, by 
being sceptical of the advisors used by governments, and especially concerned by a lack of 
heterogeneity among these advisors, stating that:   
 “KǀĞƌƚŚĞůĂƐƚĨŽƵƌǇĞĂƌƐŝƚ ?ƐƐĞĞŵĞĚŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůĞƚŚĂƚŝĨǇŽƵŐŽĨŽƌƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
Investment Bank you end up with the same four imminent consultant engineering 
techno-ĂĚǀŝƐĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚŝĨǇŽƵŐŽĨŽƌĐĂƉŝƚĂůŽƌŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞďĂŶŬƐ ? ? ?ƚŚĞǇĞŶĚƵƉǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
same techno-ĂĚǀŝƐŽƌƐ ? ?(Renewables Company (Biofuels)) 
A number of companies also talked about schemes already in place that were helpful and noted 
schemes that could potentially be used to support the industry. This finding links to the role of 
government - another theme highlighted within the interviews.   
Role of Government: The role of government was commented on in every interview and it was 
generally felt that the government had an important role to play. However there was debate as to 
whether the government was doing a good or bad job in this respect. Problems with government 
commitment, uncertainty, and communications were highlighted above. Two roles of government-
based themes were noted: policy and funding. The majority of the respondents called for clear and 
consistent policy, and felt that this was not being provided at present but was vital for continued 
investment. 
 
 “dŚĂƚŝƐƉƌŽďůĞŵŶƵŵďĞƌŽŶĞ ?ƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵŽĨĂůĂĐŬŽĨĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ? ?/ŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ
Advisory, Corporate Finance and Banking) 
 
 These findings are in line with REN21's recent analysis which found that stable renewable 
energy policies continue to be a driving force behind the development of green power capacity [3].  
A number of respondents also commented on the support, particularly financial support, given to 
the industry. It was generally seen that there was a place for both subsidies and loans. However, 
consistency of the subsidies, as with policy, was seen as important with changes in past subsidies 
making investors more cautious. It appeared that the more established companies preferred loans as 
a way of getting investment.  
 “tĞǁŽƵůĚƉƌĞĨĞƌůŽĂŶƐ ?ǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬŐƌĂŶƚƐĂƌĞƚŚĞǁĂǇĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ ?'ƌĂŶƚƐĚŝƐũŽŝŶƚŽƌ
ĞĨĨĞĐƚƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŝŶŐ ? ? ?ZĞŶĞǁĂďůĞƐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ŝŽĨƵĞůƐ ? ? ? 
ŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐĂůƐŽĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ŐƌĞĞŶŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚďĂŶŬ ?ďƵƚǁĞƌĞƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶof the basis 
on which they would operate and therefore whether it would help the industry effectively.  
Cost/Risk: As with any investment decision the balance between cost and risk played a large part. 
Risk for renewables seems to come in part ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ‘ĨĞĂƌŽĨƚŚĞƵŶŬŶŽǁŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚůŝŶŬƐƚŽƚŚĞ
knowledge elements of enablers discussed above, and a number of individuals saw in particular that 
certain renewables were more risky to investors than others:  
 
 “ ? ?ŝĨ/ǁĂƐƉƵƚƚŝŶŐĞƋƵity money in you really have to be prepared to lose it in anything 
ďƵƚǁŝŶĚ ?ŶĚ/ƚŚŝŶŬŝĨǇŽƵůŽŽŬĂƚŚŽǁŵĂŶǇƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚƐƚŚĞƌĞ ?ǀĞďĞĞŶŝŶ
ďŝŽŵĂƐƐ ?ǇŽƵĐĂŶĐŽƵŶƚǁŝƚŚŽŶĞŚĂŶĚ ? ? ? ?ĂŶŬ ? 
 
Value/Return on Investment: Alongside risk many of the respondents also commented on the 
potential return on any investment made in renewables. Many respondents noted that for most 
investors it is simply about the rate of return, above any environmental considerations. However, it 
was noted that philanthropic investors would differ in their approach:  
 
 “ ? ?ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ?ƉŚŝůĂŶƚŚƌŽƉŝĐĂůůǇƚŚĞǇĨĞĞůƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŚŝŶŐƚŽĚŽ ?ƐŽƚŚĂƚŝƐ
when like one of our investors that I work with has a personal pot of 17million that he 
puts into wave and tidal and ŚĞŬŶŽǁƐƚŚĂƚďĞƉƌŽďĂďůǇǁŽŶ ?ƚŵĂŬĞĂƌĞƚƵƌŶďƵƚŚĞŝƐ
ƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽƉƵƐŚƚŚĞŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇĂůŽŶŐ ? ? ?/ŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚĚǀŝƐŽƌǇ ?ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ&ŝŶĂŶĐĞĂŶĚ
Banking) 
 
Timescale: Timescale appeared to be of great importance for investments, especially in terms of 
government policy and subsidies. There also seems to be a disjoint between the timing investors 
want in terms of return, the timings of government subsidies and support, and the timescales used 
by renewables companies: 
 
 “ ?ǁĞƉƌŽũĞĐƚĞĚƚŽo far into the future and we set standards based on what we think 
ďĞƐƚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞǁŝůůďĞĨŝǀĞǇĞĂƌƐĂǁĂǇ ?ǁŚĞŶĂĐƚƵĂůůǇƚŚĞŵĂƌŬĞƚŝƐŽŶůǇƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚƚŽƌĞĂůůǇ
ůŽŽŬƚǁŽŽƌƚŚƌĞĞǇĞĂƌƐĂŚĞĂĚ ? ?^ƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚ/ŶǀĞƐƚŽƌ ? 
 
It seems important that everyone works on the same timescales, primarily those acceptable to 
investors for investment to continue.   
 
Personality/Individual Values: Two aspects of personality appear to be important: the personality of 
investors, and the personality of those working within renewables (the respondents within the 
study). There was concern voiced over the personality of the City in particular and its lack of fit with 
renewable investment and green technologies: 
 
 “ ?/ŵĞĂŶ ?ŝĨǇŽƵĞǀĞƌǁĂŶƚŽŶĞƐĞŶƚĞŶĐĞƚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƚŚĞŝƚǇ ?ƚŚĞŝƚǇŝƐďƵŝůƚŽŶĞŐŽ ?
testosterone and macho chest building. If you understand that then it all starts to fall 
into place, and then you can understand why selling renewable energy is a really hard 
ũŽď ?ŶĚƵŶƚŝůǁĞĐĂŶŵĂŬĞƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƉĞŽƉůĞǁĂŶƚƚŽďĞĂƚƚŚĞŝƌĐŚĞƐƚƐŽŶŝƚ ?Ɛ
always going to be ĂŚĂƌĚƐĞůů ? ? ?^ƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚ/ŶǀĞƐƚŽƌ ? 
 
 This is in line with researchers who have commented on the influential factor of masculinity 
on the US financial crisis [38] and the hyper-masculine culture of Wall Street that glorifies extreme 
risk taking [39, 40].   
The motivations of the respondents did seem in part, more for some than others, to be 
based on their own environmental beliefs, although this was balanced for most investors with other 
aspects of return and risk. 
Level of Innovation: The development stage of the renewables in question is also of importance to 
investors and ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ? ability to get investment. While some renewables are perceived as 
developed (e.g. wind) and are therefore seen as less risky (see comment regarding cost/risk above) 
most renewables are often seen as innovative and therefore high risk. As such, it seems important 
that different strategies are taken for companies at different levels of actual and perceived 
innovation. However the DECC Science and Innovation Strategy [2] notes that  “Ɛcience, technology 
and innovation are at the heart of the transition to a low-ĐĂƌďŽŶĨƵƚƵƌĞ ? ?Ɖ 5) and therefore the 
added importance of innovative projects for the ability to meet renewables targets is key. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 Each of the eight identified themes plays an important role in affecting the behaviour of 
investors within the renewables industry. More specifically the potential for much needed 
investment rests on addressing the perceived barriers. Some barriers appear to be more important 
than others, with the role of the government being discussed more than other themes and generally 
in more critical terms.  
 It is clear that government plays a role as both an enabler and a barrier to investment in 
renewables, and stability and longevity of policy plays an important role in investment decisions and 
in particular reduced risk. The latest DECC Science and Innovation strategy (April 2012)[2] is vague 
when it talks about investment and although it notes ƚŚĂƚ “we aim to achieve national and 
international action towards this goal [a safe and secure transition to low-carbon] by mobilising 
investment in low carbon infrastructure, by setting an appropriate framework of regulation, by 
providing incentives and information, and by building a broad ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶĨŽƌĐŚĂŶŐĞ ? ?p 3) it does not 
state how this might be achieved and does not seem to take into account the issues raised within 
this research. The UK Bioenergy Strategy 2012 (Department for Transport, DECC, DEFRA) [41] is also 
relatively vague in ƚĞƌŵƐŽĨ ‘ŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀŝƐŝŶŐĂŶĚĚƌŝǀŝŶŐŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ?ďƵƚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĞƚŚĂƚ “policy 
decisions [must] be sensitive to the longer timescale over which investment decisioŶƐĂƌĞŵĂĚĞ ? ?p 
 ? ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ “ǁĞĂƌĞĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚǁĞŵƵƐƚŶŽƚĂĐƚŝŶĂǁĂǇǁŚŝĐŚŵŝŐŚƚƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞůŽŶger term 
ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŚĂƐƚǇƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ?ƵŶůĞƐƐƚŚŝƐŝƐĂŶƵŶĂǀŽŝĚĂďůĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽhůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ?
(pp 56) suggesting that there is some understanding of the importance of stable policy and time 
periods to be considered. DECC [2] does note the Green Investment Bank (with £3billion to help 
companies fund clean energy schemes and encourage private sector investment) but does not state 
how the bank would operate and a number of the respondents were sceptical as to whether it 
would work. Further research should study reactions to and success of the Green Investment Bank.    
There is also a need to examine what the problem is more specifically in government 
policies, and would need to study how decisions are made about policy and which departments can 
and do play a role in this. For example a recent BBC report has suggested that MPs blame the 
treasury for making changes to the draft energy bill that will put off investors by increasing their 
risks [42]. There are multiple factors and pressures at work within government and how energy 
policy is determined and how views from investors can be fed back is of vital importance. It also 
appears that communication is key, both within different stakeholder groups but also to and from 
government.   
 In addition to general policy there is a clear difference between companies who are 
established and those which utilise more innovative technologies, those at lower technology 
readiness levels. Government needs to think more carefully about the different policies for 
investment for companies at different stages of development as it is clear that investors see these 
very differently in terms of both risk and value. In this study more innovative companies generally 
appeared to welcome grants while more established companies generally welcomed loans. There 
was little agreement over the role of subsidies but it is clear that they have an effect on investment 
behaviour.   
It is also clear that like any other investment decision there is a balance between risk and 
return but individual values do seem to play a part. How far personality and individual values play a 
part however needs further exploration. This is supported by researchers [43] who suggest that 
further studies should be aimed at the potential influence of environmental information on 
investment allocation decisions in the contexts of investment styles, investor types, information 
processing capabilities, decision aids and experience levels. All of the people questioned had some 
experience in renewables, in fact some were specialist investors, and therefore it would be useful to 
explore how and why they differ from investors with less or no experience in this area.     
Further Research: This research makes an important step towards understanding the 
behaviour of investors in relation to renewables companies and technologies. While this project has 
indicated some significant issues that are likely to be of interest to researchers from a range of 
disciplines which have an interest in the psychology of investor behaviour (e.g., behavioural 
economics, behavioural finance, economic psychology, political science), further research is required 
to explore these in more depth and to explore the overlapping and interdisciplinary nature of the 
area. For example, it would be of value to extend this research to include other types of investors 
such as institutional investors (e.g. pension funds) and high net worth individuals (HNWI). As 
Sandberg [35] ŶŽƚĞƐ “ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐƌĞĂůůǇĂƌĞƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌƉůĂǇĞƌƐŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂl 
ŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ? ?(p 143) and as such their opinions are very important. HNWI are also of importance as it 
appears from comments of financial advisers in this study that they may be the type of investor 
willing to support new and emerging technologies for more philanthropic motives.   
This research also provides us with a framework from which to develop quantitative 
modelling via a large scale questionnaire of barriers, enablers and forces affecting investment in 
renewable companies. As a starting point this work has identified potential variables of importance 
but a quantitative model needs to be built to show how these variables fit with one another and 
link/interact with one another. This type of modelling would also allow further segmentation of 
investor types (individual or institutional) and specific types of renewables in determining 
investment levels and strategies.  Work of this style would also highlight the important interfaces 
between elements of government policy, technology, investment and individual behaviour rather 
than studying these aspects in isolation.   
Returning to the initial aims of the study outlined in the introduction, the research has 
highlighted a range of barriers and enablers to investment and has highlighted the central role of 
government in ensuring that barriers are reduced and enablers are appropriate for the technology 
level and type. With regards the criticism at government which was noted, this appears for many of 
the respondents to be true but a small number of the respondents were supportive of what the 
government was doing and felt that improvements could be made. The research also showed 
similarities to the wider behaviour of green investors, those looking at the overall sustainability of 
companies in that investors are affected by the investment timescale and the experience 
(knowledge and skills) of the investor also plays a part. In other words, this research pointed out 
issues at both macro and micro level that slow down the rate of renewable investment among both 
businesses and consumers. Attempts should be made to tackle these problems simultaneously in 
order to avoid further delay in rate of investment in renewables and in time to support capital 
growth over the next few years. While revised policies could facilitate interest from investors, 
specific training programmes could be offered to employees who should aim to improve their 
knowledge and skills. Information should not only be disseminated via formal channels such official 
reports, government strategy documents but alsŽǀŝĂŝŶĨŽƌŵĂůĐŚĂŶŶĞůƐĂŶĚŝŶĂŵŽƌĞ ‘ƵƐĞƌĨƌŝĞŶĚůǇ ?
format for the interested investors. Furthermore, given the high risks and costs entailed by 
renewable investments the government should consider subsidising private investors.  
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 Appendix: Further illustrative quotation examples for themes discussed in the results section 
(1) Barriers 
x Cost 
 “ ? ?/ŶŝƚŝĂůĐŽƐƚĨŽƌŚŝŵǁĂƐĂďŽƵƚ ? ?ŬďƵƚǇŽƵĐĂŶ ?ƚĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƚŚĞĐŽƐƚŽĨĞůĞĐƚƌŝĐŝƚǇŐŽŝŶŐĨŽƌǁĂƌĚƐŽ
ĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁŚŽǁůŽŶŐŝƚǁŝůůƚĂŬĞƚŽƉĂǇŽĨĨǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĂŵĂũŽƌƉƌŽďůĞŵ ? ? ? ?/ŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů
Advisor) 
x Effect of Government 
 “ ?ƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚƐĞĞŵƚŽďĞĂďůĞƚŽƐƉŽƚƚŚĂƚŶŽƚŽŶůǇĚƌŽƉƉŝŶŐ
commitments but dropping commitments with no notice that investors will run for the hills like 
ŶŽƚŚŝŶŐĞůƐĞ ? ? ?/ŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚĂŶĚĂĚǀŝƐŽƌ ? 
 “ ?ǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚŵŝŶĚǁŚĂƚƉŽůŝĐǇǁĞ ?ƌĞƐĞƚǁŝƚŚŝŶƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞďŽƵŶĚƐ ?ďƵƚŝĨǇŽƵƐĞƚŝƚ ?ŵĂŬĞŝƚůĂƐƚĨŽƌĂƚ
ůĞĂƐƚƚĞŶǇĞĂƌƐ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌƉŽůŝĐǇǇŽƵƐĞƚǁĞĐĂŶǁŽƌŬĂƌŽƵŶĚ ? ? ?^ƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚ/ŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ
Company) 
 “ ? ?ƚŚĞŶĨŽƌƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƚŽŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞƚŚŝƐƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ? ?ƌĞŐĂƌĚƐǁŚĂƚƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞŝƐĨŽƌƐŽůĂƌ ?ŝƚ
ǁĂƐĂĚŝƐŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞĨŽƌƉĞŽƉůĞƚŽŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŶƐŽůĂƌ ? ?ĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇĨƌŽǌĞƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĂƚĂƌĞĂ ? ?
(Bank) 
x Communication 
 “Personally speaking I think that the government is doing the right thing, but I think that the 
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŝƐĂƉƉĂůůŝŶŐ ?ŝŶĨĂĐƚƚŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŝƐŽĨƚĞŶĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŶŐ ? ?/ŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚĚǀŝƐŽƌǇ ? 
 “ ? ?KƐďŽƌŶĞŵĂĚĞĂĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂďŽƵƚŶŽƚǁƌŝƚŝŶŐĐŚĞƋƵĞƐǁŝůůǇ-nilly for a carbon agenda, a throw away 
remark in a political speech, but that caused them [the investors] to stop and think are we wasting 
ŽƵƌƚŝŵĞŚĞƌĞĂŶĚŝƚŝƐĂƐƐŝŵƉůĞĂƐƚŚĂƚ ? ? ?/ŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚĂŶĚǀŝƐŽƌ ? 
x Fiduciary Duty 
 “ ?ŝƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŵĂƚƚĞƌǁŚĂƚ/ƚŚŝŶŬĂƐĂŚƵŵĂŶďĞŝŶŐ ?zĞƐ ?/ǁŽƵůĚůŝŬĞƚŽĚŽƚŚŝƐƐƚƵĨĨ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞƐŝŵƉůĞ
fact is that the law as it currently stands means that anyone who works in finance has a fiduciary duty 
ƚŽĚĞůŝǀĞƌĂƌĞƚƵƌŶƚŽƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĂĚǀŝƐĞ ?ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĂƚ ?ƐĂƉĞŶƐŝŽŶĨƵŶĚŽƌĂŶŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ
ďĂŶŬŽƌĂŶĂƐƐĞƚŵĂŶĂŐĞƌ ? ? ?^ƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚ/ŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚŽŵƉĂŶǇ ? 
  “ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚheir stakeholders were starting to say, look, okay so you have a fiduciary duty to deliver 
a financial return to us, but actually practically we want you to take other things into 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ?^ƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚ/ŶǀĞƐƚŽƌ ? 
(2) Enablers 
x Knowledge and Skills 
 “ ?ŝƚ ĚŽĞƐĐŽŵĞďĂĐŬĚŽǁŶƚŽŝƚ ?ƐĂŶĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĚƚĞĂŵ ? ? ? ?ZĞŶĞǁĂďůĞƐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?tŝŶĚ ? ? 
  “ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƉŽŝŶƚŽĨĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŝƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚďƵƚŝƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŵĞĂŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞƐƉĞŶƚƚŚĞůĂƐƚ
20 years doing what they are about to do.  XXX is a good example of that as you have a very capable 
management team all from an engineering perspective, they had no experience or in depth 
ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨƚŚĞŽĨĨƐŚŽƌĞǁŝŶĚŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?ƚŚĂƚǁĂƐŶ ?ƚĂƉƌŽďůĞŵƚŽŵĞĂƐ/ĐŽƵůĚďƌŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŽƚŚĞŵ ?
but it did mean that I could sit there with some confidence and say that these guys understand the 
operational side of what they are proposing to the market and therefore having made the 
ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚǇŽƵĐĂŶĂ ?ďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇǁŝůůďƵŝůĚƚŚĞƉůĂŶƚĂŶĚď ?ďĞĂďůĞƚŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞŝƚƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŽƌŝůǇ ? ?
(Investment Consultant and Advisor) 
 “dŽŵĞƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞsŝƌŐŝŶ'ƌĞĞŶ&ƵŶĚĂŶĚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌŝƐƚŚĂƚ/ŶĞĞĚƚŽƐƉĞŶĚůĞƐƐ
time with virgin green fund explaining the market place before they look at the proposition, and 
ƚŚĂƚ ?ƐǁŚĞƌĞ/ĨŝŶĚŵǇƐĞůĨďĂƚƚůŝŶŐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ? ? ?/ŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚĂŶĚ
Advisor) 
 “dŚĞŶĞǆƚƉƌŽďůĞŵŝƐĨŽƌƚŚĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƚŽŬŶŽǁǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞǇĐĂŶŐŽƚŽŐĞƚƐĞĐƚŽƌŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĂŶĚ
experience to help them consider the opportunity in front of them or to use for due diligeŶĐĞ ? ?
(Investment Company and Advisor) 
 “ ? ?/ƚŚŝŶŬŵŽƐƚĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƚŚĂƚƚŽĚĞůŝǀĞƌƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚŝƐǁŽƌŬƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐĂŶĞĞĚƚŽĐŽŵĞ
ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ? ? ?ZĞŶĞǁĂďůĞƐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?tŝŶĚ ? ? 
 “KǀĞƌƚŚĞůĂƐƚĨŽƵƌǇĞĂƌƐŝƚ ?ƐƐĞĞŵĞĚŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůĞƚŚĂƚŝĨǇŽƵŐŽĨŽƌƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ/ŶǀĞstment Bank you 
end up with the same four imminent consultant engineering techno-advisers; and if you go for 
ĐĂƉŝƚĂůŽƌŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞďĂŶŬƐ ? ? ?ƚŚĞǇĞŶĚƵƉǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚĞĐŚŶŽ-ĂĚǀŝƐŽƌƐ ? ? ?ZĞŶĞǁĂďůĞƐŽŵƉĂŶǇ
(Biofuels)) 
x Schemes 
 “ ?ǁĞŐŽŽŶƚŽĂŶŝŶĐƵďĂƚŽƌƐĐŚĞŵĞ as well which was extremely useful for us because not only do 
they cash flow and lot of stuff in the early days, but it provided us with a network, a professional 
ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƚŚĂƚĂůůŽǁĞĚƵƐƚŽďĞŚĂǀĞůŝŬĞĂďŝŐĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ? ?ƚŚĞŶǁĞǁĞƌĞĂďůĞƚŽ ? ?ĂƚƚƌĂĐƚƚŚĞ
invĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ?ǇŽƵůŽŽŬĂůŝƚƚůĞďŝŐŐĞƌ ?ŵŽƌĞƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů ? ? ?ZĞŶĞǁĂďůĞƐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?dŝĚĂů ? ? 
 “ ?ƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨĂ ‘ŐƌĂŶĚĨĂƚŚĞƌŝŶŐƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ? ?ĂƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĂŶŽůĚƌƵůĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐƚŽĂƉƉůǇƚŽƐŽŵĞ
existing situations, while a new rule will apply to all future ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ?/ŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚŽŵƉĂŶǇ ? 
(3) Role of the Government 
x Consistency 
 “dŚĂƚŝƐƉƌŽďůĞŵŶƵŵďĞƌŽŶĞ ?ƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵŽĨĂůĂĐŬŽĨĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ? ?/ŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚĚǀŝƐŽƌǇ ?
Corporate Finance and Banking) 
 “/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬŝƚŝƐũƵƐƚŚĂǀŝŶŐĂƐƚĂďůĞƉŽůŝĐǇ/ƚŚŝŶŬ ŝƚŝƐĂůƐŽŚĂǀŝŶŐĂĐůĞĂƌŵĞƐƐĂŐĞ ? ?/ŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ
Consultant) 
 “ĂƐŝĐĂůůǇǇŽƵǁĂŶƚƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶĐǇ ?ůŽŶŐĞǀŝƚǇĂŶĚĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐǇ ? ?ƐĞƚĂůĞǀĞůƚŚĂƚǁĂƐƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůĞĨŽƌƚĞŶ
years and do it that way, because you get proper long-term investors moving in; not a bunch of 
ĐŽǁďŽǇƐƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽƌŝƉǇŽƵŽĨĨ ? ? ?^ƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚ/ŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚŽŵƉĂŶǇ ? 
x Subsidies/loans and funding 
 “dŚĞƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĂƚƐƵďƐŝĚǇŝƐĂďƐŽůƵƚĞůǇŬĞǇƚŽƐĞĐƵƌĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞƐĞĐƚŽƌ ? ?ĂŶŬ ? 
 “ ? ?ǁĞǁĞƌĞĐĂƵŐŚƚŽƵƚďƵƚŝƚŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞĐǇ ůĞ ?ǁĞďŽƵŐŚƚƚŽŽĞĂƌůǇĂŶĚĚŝĚŶ ?ƚƐĞĞƚŚĞƐĐĂůĞ
ŽĨƚŚĞƐƵďƐŝĚŝĞƐďĞŝŶŐǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁŶ ?ƐŽǇĞƐŝƚǁŝůů ?ŵĂŬĞƵƐŵŽƌĞĐĂƵƚŝŽƵƐŐŽŝŶŐĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ ? ? ?^ƚŽĐŬďƌŽŬĞƌ ? 
 “tĞǁŽƵůĚƉƌĞĨĞƌůŽĂŶƐ ?ǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬŐƌĂŶƚƐĂƌĞƚŚĞǁĂǇĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ ?'ƌĂŶƚƐĚŝƐũŽŝŶƚŽƌĞĨĨĞĐƚƚŚĞ
ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŝŶŐ ? ? ?ZĞnewables Company (Biofuels)). 
 “/ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞƌ PtŚĂƚĚŽǇŽƵĨĞĞůĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐĨŽƌƚŚĞŐƌĞĞŶŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚďĂŶŬ ?ZĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚ P/ƚ
would be good if we could do it, well it remains to be seen on what basis they will operate. 
Interviewer:  In principle, do you think it's a good thing?  Respondent:  Well as long as it's not just 
ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌďĂŶŬ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞŶĂŐĂŝŶŝƚ ?ƐŐŽŝŶŐƚŽďĞƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƐŽƌƚŽĨƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞƐĂƐĂŶŽƚŚĞƌďĂŶŬ ? ?
(Renewables Company (Tidal)) 
(4) Cost Risk 
 “ ? ?ƚŚĞƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚƌŝƐŬƐŽĨƌĞŶĞǁĂďůĞƐĂƌĞŵĂƐƐŝvely high.  The obvious ones are around feed-in-tariffs 
ŽƌĐŽƐƚŽĨŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽƌƵŶƉƌŽǀĞŶƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐ ?ŶŽƚŵĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞŵƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇǀĂůŝĚ ?ďƵƚŝƚ ?ƐƚŚĞĨĞĂƌ
ŽĨƚŚĞƵŶŬŶŽǁŶ ? ?(Specialist Investment Company) 
 “ ? ?ŝĨ/ǁĂƐƉƵƚƚŝŶŐĞƋƵŝƚǇŵŽŶĞǇŝŶǇŽƵƌĞĂůůǇŚĂve to be prepared to lose it in anything but wind.  And 
/ƚŚŝŶŬŝĨǇŽƵůŽŽŬĂƚŚŽǁŵĂŶǇƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚƐƚŚĞƌĞ ?ǀĞďĞĞŶŝŶďŝŽŵĂƐƐ ?ǇŽƵĐĂŶĐŽƵŶƚǁŝƚŚ
ŽŶĞŚĂŶĚ ? ? ? ?ĂŶŬ ? 
(5) Value and level of return 
 “/ƚ ?ƐƵŶĨŽƌƚƵŶĂƚĞďƵƚŝƚ ?ƐũƵƐƚƚŚĞƌĞĂůŝƚǇŽĨƉĞŽƉle having money saying where am I going to get best 
ǀĂůƵĞĨŽƌŝƚ ? ? ?ĂŶŬ ? 
 “dŚĞƐĞƉĞŽƉůĞĂƌĞŶŽƚƐƚƵƉŝĚ ?ƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞŵĂĚĞƚŚĞŝƌŵŽŶĞǇďǇďĞŝŶŐǀĞƌǇĐĂŶŶǇŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ?tŚĞŶǇŽƵ
have got a £1 do you think do I put it into one project which is highly risky or another project where I 
ŬŶŽǁ/ĐĂŶƚƵƌŶĂŚƵŐĞƉƌŽĨŝƚ ? ? ? ?/ŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚĚǀŝƐŽƌǇ ?ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ&ŝŶĂŶĐĞĂŶĚĂŶŬŝŶŐ ? 
 “ ? ?ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ?ƉŚŝůĂŶƚŚƌŽƉŝĐĂůůǇƚŚĞǇĨĞĞůƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŚŝŶŐƚŽĚŽ ?ƐŽƚŚĂƚŝƐǁŚĞŶůŝŬĞŽŶĞ
of our investors that I work with has a personal pot of 17 million that he puts into wave and tidal and 
ŚĞŬŶŽǁƐƚŚĂƚďĞƉƌŽďĂďůǇǁŽŶ ?ƚŵĂŬĞĂƌĞƚƵƌŶďƵƚŚĞŝƐƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽƉƵƐŚƚŚĞŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇĂůŽŶŐ ? ?
(Investment Advisory, Corporate Finance and Banking) 
(6) Timescale 
 “ ?ǁĞƉƌŽũĞĐƚĞĚƚŽŽĨĂƌŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĨuture and we set standards based on what we think best practice 
ǁŝůůďĞĨŝǀĞǇĞĂƌƐĂǁĂǇ ?ǁŚĞŶĂĐƚƵĂůůǇƚŚĞŵĂƌŬĞƚŝƐŽŶůǇƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚƚŽƌĞĂůůǇůŽŽŬƚǁŽŽƌƚŚƌĞĞǇĞĂƌƐ
ĂŚĞĂĚ ? ?^ƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚ/ŶǀĞƐƚŽƌ ? 
(7) Personality/Individuality 
 “ ?/ŵĞĂŶ ?ŝĨǇŽƵĞǀĞƌǁĂŶƚŽŶĞƐĞntence to describe the City, the City is built on ego, testosterone 
and macho chest building.  If you understand that then it all starts to fall into place, and then you can 
understand why selling renewable energy is a really hard job.  And until we can make something that 
ƉĞŽƉůĞǁĂŶƚƚŽďĞĂƚƚŚĞŝƌĐŚĞƐƚƐŽŶŝƚ ?ƐĂůǁĂǇƐŐŽŝŶŐƚŽďĞĂŚĂƌĚƐĞůů ? ? ?^ƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚ/ŶǀĞƐƚŽƌ ? 
 “ ?ƐŽƐǇŵƉĂƚŚĞƚŝĐďƵƚŶŽƚĨĂŶĂƚŝĐŝƐǁŚĞƌĞ/ǁŽƵůĚƉƵƚŵǇƐĞůĨ ? ?>Ăǁ&ŝƌŵ ? 
 “/ƚǁĂƐŵŽƌĞŽĨĨƌŽŵĂďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁ ?ďƵƚǇŽƵŬŶŽǁ/ĂŵƐŽŵĞbody who has an 
ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞĂƐŝƚǁĂƐĂŶĚƐĂǁƚŚĂƚŝƚƐĞĞŵĞĚůŝŬĞĂ ?ǇŽƵŬŶŽǁǁŽƌƚŚǁŚŝůĞĨŽƌŵĞĂƐĂŶ
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƚŽŐĞƚŵǇƐĞůĨŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ? ? ?ZĞŶĞǁĂďůĞƐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?dŝĚĂů ? ? 
(8) Innovation 
 “/ĨǇŽƵůŽŽŬĂƚŵŽƐƚƚŚŝŶŐƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƌĞŶĞǁĂďůĞƐƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƐŽŵĞƚhings which are very focused on a new 
ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇŽƌĂŶĞǁŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ?ƚŚĞǇǁŝůůĂůǁĂǇƐďĞŚŝŐŚƌŝƐŬďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚŽƐĞƚŚŝŶŐƐĂůǁĂǇƐĂƌĞ ? ?
(Investment Consultant and Advisor) 
 “dŚĞŽƚŚĞƌďŝŐŐĞƐƚƉƌŽďůĞŵƚŚĂƚ/ŚĂǀĞƐĞĞŶŝƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝƚŝƐŶĞǁ ?ĂŶĚďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚŝƐŶĞǁ then funders 
ĚŽŶ ?ƚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝƚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚĐŽŵĞƐĂƚĂƚŝŵĞǁŚĞŶĨƵŶĚŝŶŐŝƚƐĞůĨŝƐǀĞƌǇƐŚŽƌƚ ? ? ?>Ăǁ&ŝƌŵ ? 
 
